GRASSROOTS PLEA BARGAINING
JOSH BOWERS*

INTRODUCTION

There is nothing new to the claim that plea bargaining typically
occurs outside the shadow of law. 1 This failure of bargaining to reflect
statutory law is most apparent in petty cases. 2 For me, no story captures
that reality better than the experiences of my former client, Eddie Wise.
Eddie had a long record. In addition to several convictions for
legitimate crimes, Eddie had also repeatedly pled guilty to loitering for
the purposes of begging, an offense that the Second Circuit had held
unconstitutional in 1993. 3 No valid law remained in place to cast a
shadow. Nevertheless, Eddie kept getting arrested and charged. And
he kept pleading out.
Lawyers ultimately launched a class-action suit to enjoin
enforcement of the long-defunct loitering statute.4 Their suit revealed
that Eddie was far from alone. In fact, the New York City Police
Department (NYPD) had arrested 1,876 people on the unconstitutional
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1. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004) (discussing the structural and psychological influences that skew
the bargaining process); William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargainingand Criminal Law's Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004) (discussing the manner in which substantive law

governs settlements in criminal cases).
2. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. at Pts. III-IV
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=983819.
3. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(1) (Consol. 2000) ("A person is guilty of loitering when he
... [l]oiters, remains or wanders about in a public place for the purpose of begging."); Loper
v. New York City Police Dep't, 999 F.2d 699, 705 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding peaceful begging to
constitute protected speech); see also Elva Rodriguez et al., Beggar Gets Change, Wins Suit
Forcing City to Lay Off Panhandlers,N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 11, 2005, at 3 (noting that

Eddie was convicted under statute seven times after it was held unconstitutional); Jess
Wisloski & Thomas Zambito, It Beggars Belief, City Hands Panhandler JOOG for 27 Bad
Arrests, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 12, 2006, at 3.
4. Rodriguez et al., supra note 3.
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charge between 1992 and 2004.' Remarkably, even after the 2005 suit
was filed, police made an additional fifty-eight arrests under the statute
and issued 641 summonses.
This example of bargaining and punishment outside the shadow of

valid law is admittedly extreme. But it is not necessarily surprising.
Police, prosecutors,

defense attorneys, and defendants pay little

attention to what the law is;7 they pay attention, instead, to past
practices that serve as precedents for parties' future expectations and
performances. 8 Plea bargaining provides notice to the public (and even
sometimes the institutional actors) of what the system proscribes.
Especially in low-stakes cases, plea bargaining is shaped principally by
institutional pressures and cognitive errors, and hardly at all by penal
codes.'

To identify a few of these plea bargaining pressures: prosecutors and
defense attorneys are influenced by caseload, political climate,
workgroup principles of cooperation, career and reputation concerns,

personal perspectives of just punishment, and sundry other idiosyncratic
preferences.' Defendants, of course, hope for minimal sentence length,
but in petty cases they bargain first and foremost in the shadow of their
own process costs-most notably, potential pretrial detention." Even in
the rare instances where parties try to reach shadow-of-law bargains that
approximate post-trial sentence length (discounted by the probability of
acquittal), cognitive biases cloud their abilities to agree on such accurate
figures.' Overall, then, it is more appropriate to say that criminal law

5. Wisloski & Zambito, supra note 3; see also Jim Dwyer, Police Charged Panhandlers
Under UnconstitutionalLaw, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2005, at B1.
6. Kati Cornell, Beggar Buster Blues-Judge Blasts NYPD, N.Y. POST, Nov. 30, 2006, at
39.
7. William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1898-99 (2000) ("We
need to think of criminal law as having less to do with codes and court opinions than with
policing strategies and... prosecutors' charging patterns.").
8. See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 120-21 (1978) ("After obtaining a
specific plea bargain .. . [defense attorneys] treat this disposition as a 'precedent'. ...
Prosecutors, in turn, admit that they are subject to these 'habits of disposition' . ... Thus, a
good defense deal in one case can have a trickle-down effect."); see also Bowers, supra note 2.
9. See, e.g., supranote 1.
10. See HEUMANN, supra note 8, at 104-05; Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole
in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 52-54 (1968); Bibas, supra note 1, at 2470-86; see
also Bowers, supra note 2, at Pts. III-IV.
11. See Bibas, supra note 1, at 2491-93 ("[T]he shadow of pretrial detention looms much
larger over these small cases than does the shadow of trial."); see also Bowers, supra note 2, at
Part II.
12. See Bibas, supra note 1, at 2496-2519.
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exists in the shadow of plea bargaining-not the other way around. 3
What then do I hope to add to this well-tread topic? The answer is
something quite small, yet meaningful. We can think of the heretofore
recognized influences on plea bargaining as either existing at the
institutional level or arising out of the actors themselves (for instance,
out of their own punishment preferences or cognitive limitations)." But
there is another very real unrecognized pressure that leads prosecutors
to set low prices outside the shadow of trial. It is a bottom-up-or
vertical-pressure that I call grassroots plea bargaining.
Grassroots plea bargaining is a prosecutorial response to certain
communities' views on crime and enforcement. It should not, however,
be mistaken for previously observed prosecutorial efforts to temper
punishment for particular sympathetic defendants or to reconstruct
draconian or ill-considered legislation to reflect personal and local views
of proportionality. 5 By grassroots plea bargaining, I mean a systematic
prosecutorial reduction of plea prices-even in circumstances where
prosecutors find such reductions otherwise unwarranted-in order to
purchase communal acquiescence to enforcement policies that
otherwise lack public support.
Grassroots plea bargaining goes hand-in-hand with quality-of-life (or
order-maintenance) policing. The citizens of many poor minority
communities harbor both deep crime fears and animosity to aggressive
enforcement. They want restoration of public order, but not at the high
13. By way of further example from my own practice, when it came to bargaining over
sentence length, it mattered not at all (nor would I even necessarily notice) whether a client
was charged with Trespass in the Second Degree (an A-misdemeanor, punishable by up to
one year jail) or Trespass in the Third Degree (a B-misdemeanor, punishable by up to ninety
days jail) or unlawful Trespass (a non-criminal violation, punishable by up to fifteen days
jail). N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 140.05-15 (Consol. 2000). The "going rate" for the plea was
almost always tantamount to time served. In short, the bargained-for sentence length
remained wholly independent of the charge level. To the extent the codes mattered, it was
only in the coarsest of ways: Was the charge a misdemeanor or a non-criminal violation? If it
was a misdemeanor, was a plea bargain to a violation available?
14. See Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 108 n.83 (2005) (categorizing plea bargaining's recognized
shadow-of-law failures as either "built into the institutional arrangements of the criminal
courtroom [or] growing out of common human failures to process information rationally").
15. See HEUMANN, supra note 8, at 109 (describing how prosecutor "redefines his
professional goals" in face of statutes that "'sweep too broadly'); H. RICHARD UVILLER,
VIRTUAL JUSTICE 180 (1996) ("What I thought I was doing, mainly, in the run-of-the-docket
case, was . . . rewriting the law, modifying the judgment of the legislature to fit the
circumstances of the crime, in accord with what I perceived to be the prevailing ethic in the
courts of my time and place."); Alschuler, supra note 10, at 52-54 (describing prosecutors
who try to "do the right thing"); Bibas, supra note 1, at 2470-71; Stuntz, supra note 1, at 2549.
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costs of living under constant police suspicion or losing children, friends,
and neighbors to jail cells. As police turn up enforcement pressure,
prosecutors may feel the need to pull back on the punishment throttle to
ensure that these communities accept-or at least tolerate-hard-nosed
police tactics.
At first blush, this might seem a strange and inefficient way of doing
business. Either public-order policing is a good idea or it is not. On the
first score, if it is a good idea, it would seem that citizens arrested under
public-order policing should face the same sanction that citizens faced
pre-implementation of the new policing strategy.
But efficient
deterrence is not so clean a concept. Enforcement can engender its own
resistance. Zero-tolerance policing of borderline offenses (or, in Eddie
Wise's case, non-offenses) may undermine deterrence and anti-crime
norms by increasing disaffection with the police while concurrently
creating sympathy for a growing cadre of petty-offense defendantsindividuals who might have faced tickets or warnings in other times but
now face summary arrests.
On the second score, if public-order policing is not a good idea (for
social-norms or any other reasons), then police should just soften
enforcement, instead of leaving that task to prosecutors at the back-end.
One might wonder why police would engage in the expensive practice of
mass arrest and processing only to permit defendants to subsequently
plead out and go home. But this objection ignores the fact that the
principal benefits of public-order policing are realized not in the
sentencing but in the processing of arrests themselves. For police, ordermaintenance enforcement is more than just a way to fix "broken
windows," it is a highly useful-albeit potentially normatively
problematic-tool to search and catalogue data about large segments of
the population of poor minority neighborhoods.
Ultimately, then, prosecutors lose little by reducing conviction
charges to non-criminal violations16 and by lowering sentence length on
quality-of-life offenses to time-served or its near equivalent.
Conversely, they believe they achieve something substantial: the
preservation of communal perceptions of legitimacy while enabling
heavy-handed (but tactically useful) policing. Prosecutors know that
even though minority communities may never wholly embrace summary
arrests for marginal crimes-especially when white members of affluent
communities face no similar enforcement policies-these communities
16. Violations-for example, public consumption of alcohol or disorderly conduct-are
not crimes but may carry small penalties like fines, community service, or a few days jail.
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will be more willing to at least abide mass arrests if plea prices stay low.
My project here is almost entirely descriptive. I make no welltheorized normative claim about grassroots plea bargaining. I do not
even claim that prosecutors who are influenced by it in fact manage to
achieve their ends. I simply assert that prosecutors are influenced by
it-that grassroots plea bargaining is a genuine plea bargaining pressure.
To test my thesis, I use New York City as a backdrop. I do this for three
reasons: First, New York City whole-heartedly adopted a particularly
vigorous brand of order-maintenance policing in the 1990s.' 7 Second,
unlike police forces in other cities, the NYPD did very little to solicit the
collaboration of affected communities.8 Third, generally speaking,
there is a startling dearth of data on misdemeanor case processing. 9
New York City, however, is something of an exception. Specifically, the
city's Criminal Justice Agency conducted a fairly thorough study
comparing misdemeanor enforcement for the years 1989 and 1998.20
The first period precedes the city's implementation of ordermaintenance policing; the second period coincides with it.
Even with this information, however, my analysis remains somewhat
17. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social
Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
PolicingNew York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998).
18. See Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 422-40
(2000) (comparing New York City's model of order-maintenance policing with the Boston
and Chicago models); see also infra Part I.B.
19. See Michael J. Lieber & Anita N. Blowers, Race and Misdemeanor Sentencing, 14
CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 464, 469 (2003) ("Only a few comprehensive studies of
misdemeanor sentence outcomes exist."); Ed A. Mufioz & Stephen G. Sapp, Racial/Ethnic
Misdemeanor Sentencing Disparities:Additional Evidence for Contextual Discrimination,1 J.
ETHNICITY CRIM. JUST., Mar. 2003, at 27, 29 (2003) ("The deficiency in knowledge
surrounding the adjudication of misdemeanor crimes is somewhat surprising considering they
are the most common types of offenses for which people are detained, interrogated, arrested
and convicted."); cf. James F. Nelson, A Dollar or a Day: Sentencing Misdemeanants in New
York State, 31 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 183, 183 (1994) ("Most studies of racial disparities in
case processing decisions have focused on sentencing decisions for persons convicted of
serious crimes.").
20. The study's findings are collected in three separate documents, all available at
www.cjareports.org/index3.htm. NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, RESEARCH
BRIEF: THE IMPACT OF QUALITY-OF-LIFE POLICING (2003) [hereinafter, CJA, RESEARCH
BRIEF]; NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS: TRENDS
IN CASE AND DEFENDANT CHARACTERISTICS, AND CRIMINAL COURT PROCESSING AND
OUTCOMES, IN NON-FELONY ARRESTS PROSECUTED IN NEW YORK CITY'S CRIMINAL
COURTS (2002), [hereinafter CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS]; NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AGENCY, TRENDS IN CASE AND DEFENDANT CHARACTERISTICS, AND CRIMINAL
COURT PROCESSING AND OUTCOMES, OF PROSECUTED ARRESTS FOR MISDEMEANOR AND
LESSER-SEVERITY OFFENSES IN NEW YORK CITY (2001) [hereinafter CJA, MISDEMEANOR
TRENDS].
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incomplete. Indeed, the data I offer as consistent with grassroots plea
bargaining may be consistent also (at least partially) with other oftrecognized plea bargaining influences, most significantly heavy
caseloads. Consequently, the aim of my project is to show only that
grassroots plea bargaining is a plausible influence that further obscures
law's shadow. In short, I open the discussion, but I leave to the
econometricians the significant task of definitively measuring the impact
of grassroots plea bargaining-if that is even possible. After all, it may
be that the wide range of distinct influences on real-world bargaining is
unknowable and the strength of any isolated identified influence
"unquantifiable. ''21 But even if grassroots plea bargaining is ultimately
immeasurable with precision, it remains worthwhile to recognize it as
another pressure point-an additional ingredient in the mix.
The project has three parts. In Part I, I draw on social-norms
theories that explore the importance of communal perceptions of law's
legitimacy. I then illustrate how New York City's initial adoption of
"broken-windows" discretion soon became a policy that more closely
approximated zero tolerance. In Part II, I describe prosecutorial biases
that favor the charging of defendants in public-order cases. However, I
also provide data that shows that in New York City in the 1990s these
same defendants-once charged-typically received increasingly lenient
plea bargains. I then provide reasons to believe that conventional
explanations fail to account wholly for this leniency trend. Finally, in
Part III, I attempt to demonstrate that grassroots plea bargaining is a
genuine force that exerts downward pressure on plea prices, at least in
the order-maintenance-policing context.
I. ORDER-MAINTENANCE POLICING & PERCEPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY

To properly comprehend the reasons for grassroots plea bargaining
and the influence it had on plea prices in New York City, two first-order
aspects of order-maintenance policing must be understood: first, the
degree to which normative crime control turns on public perceptions of
the legitimacy of law; and second, the way in which order-maintenance
policing in New York City transformed from a policy of discretionary
enforcement into one of zero tolerance.

21. Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of BargainingPower, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 171

(2005).
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A. Legitimacy
Normative crime control ultimately depends on "bring[ing] the
potential offender to see prohibited conduct as unattractive because it is
inconsistent with the norms of family or friends and, even better, with
the person's own internalized sense of what is acceptable., 22 The law's
"normative punch" is weakened when communities identify with
criminals over the police and view enforcement as "oppressive and
discriminatory," rather than "stigmatizing." ' When the public begins to
side with criminals over police, deterrence and voluntary compliance
with law are undermined: "Crimes become self-defeating.
2 4 . . . [The]
resistance.
and
opposition
own
its
generates
law
criminal
This legitimacy problem is especially acute in the petty-crime
context because these offenses proscribe conduct that is not intuitively
criminal. All right-minded people know that robbery, rape, and murder

22. Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the CriminalLaw Care What the Layperson Thinks Is
Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1840, 1861 (2000)
("The criminal law cares about layperson's intuitions of justice because their incorporation is
essential to normative crime control. . . . [P]eople obey the law because they fear the
disapproval of their social group if they violate the law."); see TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE
OBEY THE LAW 31-37, 64-68, 161-62 (1990) ("[Sjtudies suggest that those who view
authority as legitimate are more likely to comply with legal authority, whether the legitimacy
is expressed as obligation or as support.").
23. Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1872, 1877 ("If the law strays too far from the norms, the
public will not respect the law, and hence will not stigmatize those who violate it. Loss of
stigma means loss of the most important deterrent the criminal justice system has."); see also
Jeffrey Fagan et al., Neighborhood, Crime, and Incarcerationin New York City, 36 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 71, 73 (2004); Robinson, supra note 22, at 1841 ("Effective normative
crime control requires a criminal law that has moral credibility within the community it
governs.").
24. Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1880; see also, George Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Gang
Behavior, Law Enforcement, and Community Values, in VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY 173,
191 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds., 1994) (noting that using "bricks and sticks" to enforce crime
in ways that communities find unfair "may be self-defeating"); Jeffrey A. Fagan & Garth
Davies, Policing Guns: OrderMaintenance and Crime Control in New York, in GUNS, CRIME,
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 191, 210 (Bernard E. Harcourt ed., 2003) (arguing that many
minority communities suffer "stigma saturation" and consequently, "[w]hen legal control
engenders resistance,... the opportunity to leverage formal social control into informal social
control is lost"). See generally Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New
Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997); Tracey L. Meares et al., Updating the
Study of Punishment,56 STAN. L. REV. 1171 (2004).
This observation that enforcement practices may prove self-defeating is as true of foreign
affairs as it is of criminal law. See, e.g., JULIA E. SWEIG, FRIENDLY FIRE: LOSING FRIENDS
AND MAKING ENEMIES IN THE ANTI-AMERICAN CENTURY (2006); Dana Priest & Josh

White, War Helps Recruit Terrorists, Hill Told: Intelligence Officials Talk of Growing
Insurgency, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2005, at Al.
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are wrong, but reasonable minds may disagree about "borderline"
crimes, like aggressive panhandling, public urination, or even simple
drug possession. 26 This is not to say that law-abiding members of
minority communities crave public disorder-just the opposite.27 But,
for them, "quality of life" is a more nuanced concept: it may be affected
negatively not only by disorder, but also by the police charged with
rooting it out. 28 Police and prosecutors who respond too stridently to
"borderline" behavior (that is more annoying than anything else) run
the risk of producing sympathy for the rule breakers.29 Under certain
enforcement conditions, suspects of petty crime can become the
perceived victims of police aggression. And police become agents of
oppression-the "occupying force."30
This tenuous balance underscores seemingly conflicting findings that
show great fear of crime in minority communities3 ' but concurrent
25. See Robinson, supra note 22, at 1865 n.84 ("[A]s a matter of common sense, the
law's moral credibility is not needed to tell a person that murder, rape, or robbery is wrong.");
Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1871 ("The mass of the population avoids seriously bad behavior not
because they know it can be found in the codes, but because they know the behavior is
thought to be seriously bad.").
26. See Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1894 ("The more 'crime' includes things that only a slight
majority of the population thinks is bad, the harder it is to sell the idea that 'criminal' is a
label that only attaches to very bad people."); see also Robinson, supra note 22, at 1865 n.84.
27. Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of
Panhandlers,Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167-68, 1182 (1996)
(noting that black politicians in Washington, D.C. and Atlanta embraced anti-panhandling
measures); infra note 34 and accompanying text.
28. See Tracey L. Meares, ChartingRace and Class Differences in Attitudes Toward Drug
Legalization and Law Enforcement: Lessons for Federal Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 137, 138-46 (1997) (discussing "dual frustration" in minority communities that
"uniquely experience problems" associated with both crime and criminal enforcement). For
me, the reggae classic Police and Thieves captures this conflicted thinking perfectly. JUNIOR
MURVIN & LEE "SCRATCH" PERRY, Police and Thieves, on POLICE AND THIEVES (Mango
1977) ("Police and thieves in the street .... .Fighting
the nation with their guns and
ammunition .... All the crimes committed day by day .... All the peacemakers turn war
officers.").
29. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text; cf. Robinson, supra note 22, at 1866
(noting that criminal law generally does not and ought not punish behaviors that are simply
"annoying to some people").
30. Erik Luna, Race, Crime, and Institutional Design, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
Summer 2003, at 183, 185. Thus, African-Americans are several times more likely to have a
low or very low opinion of the honesty and ethical standards of police. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS
ONLINE tbl.2.21 (2003), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/tost_2.html. And they are almost
three times more likely to have very little confidence in the police and to see police brutality
as an issue in their communities. Id. at tbls.2.21 & 2.0002.2005.
31. African-Americans are more afraid than whites to walk alone in their own
neighborhoods. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
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aversion to tough-on-crime measures. On the one hand, members of
minority communities are the most likely crime victims and therefore
have a greater stake in effective enforcement.33 Indeed, they are
frequently among the vanguard pushing for increased attention to
unaddressed crime problems.
On the other hand, these same
community members recognize that although the criminal element may
be a scourge on the community, it is still a part of the communitywhereas the police typically are not. Accordingly, the crime victims and
the perpetrators cannot help but keep strong ties: they share "linked
fate[s]." 35 Ultimately, the community probably favors some sanctions
for the disorderly, but within narrow bounds.36 When the police
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 130-31 tbl.2.38 (2003) [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK]. They
worry more about every category of crime than whites. Id. at 132 tbl.2.39. They are more
than twice as likely to fear being murdered. Id. They are far more likely to believe the crime
rate is rising. Id. at 128 tbl.2.34. They are consistently more likely to report that society
spends too little on crime. Id. at 134-35 tbl.2.42. And they are more likely to favor
criminalization of drugs. Id. at 158-59 tbl.2.68; see also Meares, supra note 28, at 145-47.
32. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 31, at 140-41 tbl.2.47 (finding that African-Americans are
two to three times more likely to conclude that courts treat criminals too harshly); see also
Meares, supra note 28, at 145-47; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of
Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL. F.
197, 208-10. See generally Lawrence D. Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste for Punishment:
Black and White Americans' Views on the Death Penalty and the War on Drugs, 1 DU BOIS
REV. 151,156-57 (2004).
33. Meares & Kahan, supra note 32, at 208.
34. Id. at 210; Ellickson, supra note 27, at 1190; Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal
Law, and Racial Discrimination:A Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (1994).
35. Tracey L. Meares, It's a Question of Connections, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 579, 588-89
(1997); accord Meares & Kahan, supra note 32, at 210 ("Inner-city teens and even gang
members are linked to the majority by strong social and familial ties.... [T]he troublemakers
are natives."); Jody David Armour, Bring the Noise, 40 B.C. L. REV. 733, 735 (1999) (noting
"deep sense of connectedness and sympathy that law-abiding blacks feel toward their
wayward sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, fathers and mothers, friends and cousins, as
well as toward blacks they don't know personally but with whom they share a common
plight"); Meares, supra note 28, at 160 ("The young black men wreaking havoc in the ghetto
are still 'our youngsters' in the eyes of many of the decent poor and working-class black
people who are sometimes their victims." (quoting Glenn C. Loury, Listen to the Black
Community, PUB. INTEREST, Sept. 22, 1994, at 33, 35.)). As critics of the incarceration boom
make plain, whole communities suffer when large segments are warehoused in prisons. Paul
Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105
YALE L.J. 677, 690-91 & nn.73-74, 695 (1996) ("These costs... include the perceived dearth
of men 'eligible' for marriage, the large percentage of black children who live in femaleheaded households, the lack of male 'role models' for black children, . . . the absence of
wealth in the black community, and the large unemployment rate among black men."). See
generally BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006); Dorothy
E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American
Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004).
36. As Tracey Meares explained, "[W]hen there is mutual support between ... law-
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overstep these bounds, it is not the disorder but the police themselves
that become principal foci of community ire. 7 Law-abiding citizens
come to fear and loathe "borderline" crime far less than order-

maintenance policing. 8
B. Zero Tolerance

In 1982, James Q. Wilson and George Kelling wrote a seminal essay
introducing the "broken windows" theory of deterrence.3 9 Wilson and
Kelling argued that public disorder left unchecked breeds more serious

crime.'

In the early 1990s, New York City embraced the idea,

implementing broad strategies that targeted low-level offenses like
public urination, drinking, and pot smoking; graffiti; turnstile hopping;
and aggressive panhandling.4 1 In its initial incarnation, proponents of
the broken-windows theory generally (and the New York City approach
specifically) believed that the policy worked best by decentralizing
police response to public disorder to increase enforcement flexibility
and effectiveness. Implementation turned on providing police ample
discretion: they could make arrests for public-order offenses, they could
give tickets or warnings, they could do something else all together, or

abiders and lawbreakers, it may be difficult to draw lines between them by penalizing
lawbreakers very harshly for nonviolent offenses." Meares, supra note 35, at 589. This is a
main reason that Meares and Kahan favor gang-loitering ordinances:
[M]inority residents of high crime communities
themselves off entirely from those against whom
was enforced.
In fact, it may be precisely because they care
persons that residents of the inner-city prefer

do not desire to cut
the gang loitering law
so deeply about these
relatively mild gang

loitering and curfew laws over draconian . . . measures.

Inner-city

residents may believe these harsher penalties visit an intolerably
destructive toll on the whole community.
Meares & Kahan, supra note 32, at 210; see also William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1837 (1998).

37. See Meares, supra note 35, at 590.
38. See Butler, supra note 35, at 691 n.76 (noting that Henry Louis Gates and Wynton
Marsalis both report the criminal justice system as their "worst fear").
39. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1982, at 29.
40. Id.
41. See Harcourt, supra note 17, at 292.
42. See Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution,
32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 317 (2005); Jeffrey Rosen, Excessive Force-Why Patrick
Dorismond Didn't Have to Die, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 2000, at 24.
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they could do nothing at all.43 But in New York City the approach
"morphed" over time into a perhaps initially unintended policy of zero
tolerance."
What heralded this change was recognition at the NYPD's highest
levels that summary arrests conferred greater benefits than tickets and
warnings.4 ' First, the NYPD often found contraband and other evidence
of more serious crime when it stopped and searched suspects for petty
offenses.46 Second, the arrestees sometimes had open warrants that
were discovered only in processing the arrests. Third, the NYPD used
arrests to collect fingerprints and other pedigree information that
proved beneficial in future criminal investigations.
Concurrently, the
NYPD relied on new data-basing technology and other innovations that
made feasible the efficient processing of mass arrests. 49 For example,
then-police commissioner Bill Bratton employed a "Bust Bus," a city
bus retrofitted into an on-the-spot arrest-processing center."
43. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 39, at 29; Rosen, supra note 42, at 24-25.
44. See Rosen, supra note 42, at 24-26 (quoting George Kelling: "'Zero tolerance' is a
phrase I never use, never have used."); see also Tim Newburn & Trevor Jones, Symbolizing
Crime Control: Reflections on Zero Tolerance, 11 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 221, 226
(2007) ("Although ... the main players in the New York policing story distanced themselves
from the term Zero Tolerance, it became inextricably associated with the policing approaches
developed under [Police Commissioner] Bill Bratton."). Conversely, Bernard Harcourt
stresses that order-maintenance policing in New York City was zero tolerance all along.
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN

WINDOWS POLICING 50 & 252 n.3 (2001) ("[The] approach was, from its inception, a zerotolerance approach ....
[It was] not an exercise in police discretion ....
It was about
sweeps.").
45. See HARCOURT, supra note 44, at 50 & 252 n.3 ("Bratton and Giuliani understood
from the beginning the close relationship between order maintenance, sweeps, and catching
criminals."); Zeidman, supra note 42, at 317; Rosen, supra note 42, at 24-26.
46. See HARCOURT, supra note 44, at 48; Rosen, supra note 42, at 24 ("[P]olice stop,
frisk, and arrest vast numbers of young black and Hispanic men for minor offenses, in the
hopes that turnstile jumpers and pot smokers may also be guilty of more serious offenses.").
47. See HARCOURT, supra note 44, at 48 (noting that one in seven of those arrested for
hopping turnstiles had outstanding warrants); Rosen, supra note 42, at 26.
48. See HARCOURT, supra note 44, at 48; Rosen, supra note 42, at 26 (describing account
of violent-crime defendant who was arrested based on fingerprints that were collected
pursuant to earlier subway-hop arrest).
49. See CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at 32 (noting that technological
developments "made possible, among other things, faster pre-arraignment processing of
defendants... [and the implementation of] more restrictive [arrest] policies"); see also
HARCOURT, supra note 44, at 48; Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken
Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 472
(2000) (describing New York City's "sophisticated data-driven . . . system-Compstat");
Newburn & Jones, supra note 44, at 226 (same).
50. HARCOURT, supra note 44, at 48.
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Public-order policing, thus, became no mere end in itself but an
investigatory means-less of a social problem and more of a policing
5

"opportunity.", ' As Jeffrey Rosen put it: "Instead of prosecuting lower-

level offenses to encourage an atmosphere of social order that would

prevent more serious crime, [authorities] began prosecuting lower-level
offenses in order to catch more serious criminals., 52 Commissioner
Bratton, himself, gleefully recounted: "Every arrest was like opening a
box of Cracker Jack. What kind of toy am I going to get? Got a gun?
Got a knife? Got a warrant? . . . It was exhilarating for the cops."53
Unsurprisingly, the NYPD's upper ranks turned up the pressure on beat

officers to satisfy higher arrest quotas."
The end result was a wide police net that captured an extraordinarily

broad cross-section of citizens.55 In the 1990s, the city witnessed a rise in
the arrest and prosecution rates of both older defendants and younger

51. Rosen, supra note 42, at 24, 26.
52. Id. at 26. "Zero tolerance focuses not on deterring crime but on discovering it." Id.
at 24; see also Zeidman, supra note 42, at 317 ("No longer were the police targeting low-level
offenses to restore social order; instead their modus operandi was to catch more serious
criminals. The motivation to arrest even more people grew accordingly.").
Recent attention to the NYPD's "Operation Lucky Bag," illustrates this point. Under
the sting operation, police leave unattended bags on subway platforms and arrest commuters
who take them. Editorial, Manufacturing Misdemeanors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at A20;
Dan Mangan, Crooks 'Carted' Off to Prison-NYPD'sBait Snags Thieves, N.Y. POST, Feb.
27, 2006, at 15; Police Sting Operation Lucky Bag Has Some Calling Entrapment,
N.Y.1NEWS, Mar. 1, 2007, available at http://nylnews.com/nyl/content/index.jsp?
stid=6&aid=67233. The operation has been called everything from entrapment to a colossal
waste of resources. True, the operation may be shaky normatively and legally, but it is not
wasteful. It gives the NYPD opportunities to make arrests, and these arrests alone have
value. Indeed, the NYPD has offered precisely this defense of the operation, stressing the
operation's success in netting career criminals. Mangan, supra. In short, police create
disorder to police disorder-not as a futile exercise or as a mere mechanism to bolster arrest
numbers, but because policing disorder is itself advantageous.
53. HARCOURT, supra note 44, at 10; see also id. at 100-02 (noting that misdemeanor
arrests led to arrests for more serious crimes).
54. See id. at 176 (noting that Bratton directed his force to stop issuing desk-appearance
tickets in lieu of formal arrests); Newburn & Jones, supra note 44, at 226 ("Bill Bratton
described the twice-weekly Compstat meetings as requiring precinct commanders 'to be ready
to review their up-to-date computer-generated crime statistics and relate what things are
going to be done to achieve crime reduction."'); see also CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra

note 20, at 39 (finding that summary arrests for minor offenses shifted throughout the 1990s
from "innovation" to "norm"). See generally Fagan et al., supra note 23, at 80 (describing
NYPD programs designed to generate high rates of drug arrests).
55. CJA, RESEARCH BRIEF, supra note 20, at 7 ("[T]hese [police] tactics have swept
into the criminal courts large numbers of older, chronic offenders, and young people ... often
from minority communities and without adult criminal records, arrested for low-level drug
offenses.").
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defendants (many of whom had no criminal records). Specifically, from
1989 to 1998, the rates of non-felony cases against defendants aged
sixteen to twenty and defendants aged over forty approximately
doubled.5 6 The total number of non-felony cases against all defendants
without records rose by 233%. 57
Table 1
and Clean-Record
of
Older, Younger,
Prosecutions
Non-Felony
8
Defendants
1989

1998

9.2% (7,964)

19% (33,461)

Cases
Age 41+

10.3% (8,954)

20.4% (35,915)

Cases
Without

49.4% (38,160)

54.1% (89,132)

Rate of Non-Felony Cases
Against Defendants Age 16-20

(total number)
Rate of Non-Felony
Against Defendants
(total number)
Rate of Non-Felony
Against Defendants

Records (total number)

Significantly, however, these enforcement policies were zero
tolerance in certain communities only. Conversely, predominately white
and affluent neighborhoods were left largely unaffected. 9 In fact, in
1998, the rate of non-felony prosecutions against whites was almost a
third lower than in 1989. 60 In short, as police ramped up to zero
56. CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at fig.3a; see also infra tbl.1. Similarly,
the rate of cases against defendants aged sixteen to twenty with no prior convictions more
than doubled. CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.11.
57. CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.11.
58. Id. at fig.5.
59. See Jeffrey Fagan, Race, Legitimacy, and Criminal Law, 4 SOULS 69, 70 (2002)
("Under the recent policies of the New York City Police Department, aggressive stops and
searches have been disproportionately aimed at nonwhite citizens, far outpacing their actual
involvement in crime."); Fagan & Davies, supra note 49, at 458-63; Zeidman, supra note 42,
at 318, 320 (noting that minorities disproportionately bore the brunt of proliferation of stopand-frisk practices); see also CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD, STREET STOP
ENCOUNTER REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF CCRB COMPLAINTS RESULTING FROM THE NEW
YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP & FRISK" PRACTICES, June 2001, at 1-2,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/stop.pdf [hereinafter CCRB]. See generally Fagan et al.,
supra note 23, at 74 ("[Tlhe overall excess of incarceration rates over crime rates seems to be
concentrated among non-white males living in [New York] City's poorest neighborhoods.").
60. CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at fig.3a.
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tolerance, they paid less attention to white New Yorkers who were

committing petty offenses.
Accordingly, in a densely populated
metropolis such as New York City, law-abiding community members in
the affected communities could readily bear witness to what police were

doing in the immediate neighborhoods-but not the more affluent and
whiter ones nearby.
The

fallout

of such

highly

localized

enforcement

was

the

disintegration of norms against "borderline" conduct. Community
members came to feel that certain behavior-for instance, wandering
uninvited into building lobbies-was proscribed only for them.6
Consequently, anti-crime norms shifted perceptibly against the police
and in favor of the perceived-aggrieved petty criminals.

62

Law-abiding

community members saw the police stop, search, and arrest great
numbers of their acquaintances, friends, and relatives (most notably
their children).63
Many of the law abiding even experienced
enforcement firsthand because less discriminate policing practices led
invariably to higher error rates. 6' Unsurprisingly, complaints about
61. Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1880; see also Fagan & Davies, supra note 49, at 462 ("[W]hat
was constructed as 'order-maintenance policing' . . . was widely perceived among minority
citizens as racial policing, or racial profiling."); Stuntz, supra note 36, at 1800 ("[T]he message
becomes: The behavior is bad when people in that class and neighborhood do it. That is not a
message likely to have normative force for those who are its targets."). On such matters, hiphop lyrics can provide a salient and under-emphasized snapshot of inner-city perspective.
See, e.g., TALIB KWELI, Protective Custody, on HIP HOP FOR RESPECT EP (Rawkus 2000)

(lyrics available at http://www.lyricsmania.com/lyrics/talib kweli-lyrics_4001/lyrics11903/
protective custody-lyrics_138148.html) ("Justice? All I see is 'Just Us' gettin' knocked,
locked, and bust."). See generally Paul Butler, Much Respect Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of
Punishment,56 STAN. L. REV. 983 (2004).
62. See Rosen, supra note 42, at 24 ("Zero tolerance has undermined the popular
support upon which effective crime-fighting ultimately relies."); see, e.g., BRAND NUBIAN,
Probable Cause, on FOUNDATION (Arista Records 1998) ("They say protect and to serve and
never give the people the respect they deserve, as if they wasn't equal. These is man-made
laws, selectively applied.... Now Giuliani wanna talk about the quality of life. Think he got
the right to follow me at night.... You don't have to break no laws. They just say probable
cause.").
63. As the criminal justice agency noted, early city-generated policy papers that
trumpeted the virtues of broken-windows enforcement had failed to foresee the great
increases in arrest and prosecution of the young, and accordingly under-estimated public
dissatisfaction with the policy. CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at 39.
64. See Stuntz, supra note 36, at 1821 ("But there are other costs to these tactics, costs
borne not by police officers but by innocent citizens of the targeted neighborhoods. Large
numbers of street stops based on fairly casual cues mean large numbers of bad stops as well as
good ones."); see, e.g., Zeidman, supra note 42, at 343 (discussing an informal poll revealing
that with few exceptions residents in these communities reported being subjected to street
searches).
See generally JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 218 (1966) ("If an honest citizen resides in a

2007]

GRASSROOTS PLEA BARGAINING

police brutality skyrocketed as vigorous enforcement continued to put
strain on already fragile police-community relations.
Ultimately,
people in the target neighborhoods came to see arrests as more of an
affliction that unfortunate community members "caught" than as a
deserved state response to justifiably unlawful conduct.'
II. MORE CHARGES, LESS PUNISHMENT
Zero tolerance may describe criminal enforcement along any of
three principal axes: the degrees to which (i) police make arrests, (ii)
prosecutors levy charges, or (iii) prosecutors maximize conviction
sentences. As indicated, the NYPD tried to maximize arrests under the
guise of order-maintenance policing. Prosecutors, however, took a more
nuanced approach. They levied charges with increasing frequency but
concurrently offered progressively more lenient bargains.
A. ChargingFrequency and DismissalAversion
Generally speaking, prosecutors possess a strong predilection in
favor of levying and keeping charges-essentially, a mindset of "nondefeat. ''67
To some degree this is a product of an engrained
neighborhood heavily populated by criminals, just as the chances are high that he might be
one, so too are the chances high that he might be mistaken for one."); Akerlof & Yellen,
supra note 24, at 194 ("There is thus the possibility that inner-city neighborhoods may be
caught in a crime-ridden equilibrium in which the innocent are punished along with the guilty
and, because this occurs, the community resents and frustrates the police."); Bowers, supra
note 2, at Part I.
65. CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at 38 ("[C]ommunity relations, which
supposedly should have been improved by police efforts to restore order and civility in
neighborhoods, have lagged far behind the achievement of order maintenance goals."); see
also Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing and
Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 1989-2000, 6 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB.
POL'Y 165, 166; CCRB, supra note 59, at 1; Zeidman, supra note 42, at 318.
66. See Butler, supra note 61, at 998 n.91 (quoting common hip-hop refrain: to "catch a
case"); cf. BIG-L, Ebonics, on THE BIG PICTURE (Rawkus 2000) ("If you caught a felony you
caught a 'F'.").
67. Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 CONFLICT RESOL.
52, 57 (1967) ("In the county studied, the prosecutor's office cared less about winning than
about not losing. The norm is so intrinsic . . . [i]t cannot be attributed to such a simple and
obvious fact as the periodic requirement of reelection. Indeed, reelection seemed to be taken
for granted."); accord Bibas, supra note 1, at 2472 ("[Prosecutors'] psychology of risk aversion
and loss aversion reinforces the structural incentives to ensure good statistics and avoid
risking losses."); Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We
Reliably Acquit the Innocent, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1363 (1997); Alissa Pollitz Worden,
Policymaking by Prosecutors: The Uses of Discretion in Regulating Plea Bargaining, 73
JUDICATURE 335, 337 (1990) ("Conviction rates constitute simplistic but easily advertised
indicators of success since they appear to measure prosecutors' ability to win cases.").
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prosecutorial "presumption of guilt."' More significantly, in the context
of order-maintenance enforcement particularly, prosecutors make and
follow through with charges out of fealty to police. 9 In these publicorder cases, police typically provide the entire impetus for arrests,
because the arrests are made on the basis of police observations, not
crime reports.70 Therefore, prosecutors cannot decline to prosecute or
dismiss public-order offenses without at least implicitly rejecting police
decisions. And such rejection would reinforce the undesirable message
that police are unjustifiably targeting poor and minority citizens."
Conversely, when prosecutors process arrests that arise out of citizen
crime reports, they can elect not to charge or to dismiss for policeneutral reasons-for example, that witnesses seem incredible or
uncooperative.
Indeed, studies have found that witness noncooperation is the leading cause of case dismissal and no-charge
decisions. 2
This makes sense of otherwise seemingly curious data on charging
and dismissal rates in New York City in the 1990s. Specifically, the data
shows, first, that non-felony charging rates rose and pre- and post-charge
dismissal rates fell, even as prosecutors were called upon to process
more than twice as many arrests-most of them for public-order
"victimless" offenses 3 Prosecutors charged more and dismissed less68. HEUMANN, supra note 8, at 103; accord Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence:
Speculation and Data About the Acquitted, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167, 1188 (2004); Givelber,
supra note 67, at 1363 ("Having made this decision [to charge], the prosecutor will not retreat
easily from it without securing something in return, such as a plea."); Andrew D. Leipold, The
Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1297, 1328 (2000); Skolnick,
supra note 67, at 62.
69. See George F. Cole, The Decision to Prosecute,in ROUGH JUSTICE 123, 127 (John A.
Robertson ed., 1974) ("[T]he police ... are dependent upon the prosecutor to accept the
output of their system; rejection of too many cases can have serious repercussions affecting
the morale, discipline, and workload of the force."); see, e.g., Amy Waldman, Diallo Case
Tests Bronx Prosecutor,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1999, at B1 ("For [prosecutors] good relations
with the police are crucial ....

District attorneys know that if they are perceived as being

unfair to the police, securing cooperation for subsequent investigations . . . can be much
harder."); see also Givelber, supra note 68, at 1362; Leipold, supra note 68, at 1328.
70. See Stuntz, supra note 36, at 1819-21. See generally Heymann, supra note 18, at 42223 (describing differences between reactive and preventative policing).
71. See supra Part I.B and notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., HANS ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 26-28 (1982); see also
Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice and the Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635,
644-46 & nn.33 & 35 (1999).
73. CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at 12 & tbls.1 & 14.

Specifically, in

1989, there were 144,779 non-felony arrests and 86,822 non-felony arraigned cases, meaning
prosecutors charged in 60% of the cases. Id. at 12 & tbl.1. In 1998, there were 246,957 nonfelony arrests and 176,432 non-felony arraigned cases, meaning prosecutors charged in 71.4%
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even as they wrestled with far higher caseloads-because they could;
they did not need lay-witnesses in order to push these victimless publicorder cases forward. In short, during the very period that police were
arresting citizens en masse, prosecutors were electing to accept police
output with higher frequency. The Giuliani administration instituted a
policing policy of zero tolerance, and prosecutors did more than just
keep up."
Second, the data demonstrates that non-felony harm-to-persons
cases in the second period were dismissed at a rate almost ten times
higher than the rate for non-felony drug cases and over twenty times
higher than the rate for fraud cases (a category principally comprised of
turnstile hops).75 At first blush, it seems odd that prosecutors would
more readily dismiss arguably violent cases with concrete victims. But
that is just the point: in those cases, prosecutors typically needed the
victims (or other lay witnesses) to cooperate. When prosecutors did not
have such cooperation, they had no choice but to dismiss; conversely,
when prosecutors could proceed, they did so.

of the cases. Id. Likewise, dismissals dropped during the same period, from 11.6% to 8.9% of
non-felony cases. Id. at tbl.14.
74. Cf. CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS, supra note 20, at 71 & tbls.44B & 44E ("[T]he
actors and agencies operating within the Criminal Court function in a reactive manner,
responding to criminal justice policy decisions made outside of the court system but which
determine to a very great extent both the volume and nature of the caseloads of the criminal

courts.").
75. CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at 16 & tbl.15.
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Table 2
Non-Felony Arrest and Prosecution Rates76
1989

1998

Total Non-Felony Arrests
(percentage increase in arrests)

144,779

246,957 (+71%)

Total Non-Felony Prosecutions
(percentage increase in
prosecutions)

86,822

176,432 (+103%)

Rate of Prosecuted Non-Felony
Arrests

60%

71.4%

Rate of Dismissed Non-Felony
Cases

11.6%

8.9%

Rate of Dismissed Non-Felony
Harm-to-Persons Cases

34%

37%

Rate of Dismissed Non-Felony

8.3%

3.9%

4.4%

1.5%

Drug Cases

Rate of Dismissed Non-Felony
Fraud Cases

B. Leniency
When it came to plea bargaining, however, prosecutors did
something wholly different. Far from instituting a policy of zero
tolerance, prosecutors provided more and more lenient and summary
offers of adjournments in contemplation of dismissal (ACDs)" or no76. Id. at fig.1.

77. Under the terms of an ACD, the case is pulled from the court calendar, but it
remains open for six or twelve months during which time the defendant must stay out of
trouble (and possibly meet other conditions). N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 170.55-56 (Consol.
2000). If the defendant complies with the terms of the ACD, her case is ultimately dismissed;
if not, the case may be restored to the calendar. Id. Some debate exists over whether ACDs
are more akin to dismissals or to adjudications of culpability. See JAMES F. NELSON, RACIAL
AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN PROCESSING PERSONS ARRESTED FOR MISDEMEANOR
CRIMES: NEW YORK STATE, 1985-1986 19-20 (1991). Like Nelson, I believe that ACDs

should be "labeled culpable dispositions because they resemble conditional discharges and
probation sentences." Id. at 20 ("It is hard to imagine when the court would prefer to dispose
an innocent defendant with an ACD rather than with a case dismissal.").
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time pleas to non-criminal violations-particularly to defendants
without criminal records.
First, with respect to charge reductions, far fewer criminal charges
remained misdemeanors for the purposes of disposition. Specifically,
the rate of ACDs rose from 11% to 30% of all non-felony cases. 78 And,
even for cases that resulted in some kind of conviction, the rate of
reduction to non-criminal violations rose from 44% to 52% of nonfelony conviction cases.79 Admittedly, for recidivist defendants, rates of
ACDs and plea reductions to violations rose only slightly: ACDs rose
from 4% to 9% of all non-felony cases and plea reductions to violations
rose from 28% to 32% of non-felony conviction cases."0 But for
defendants with no criminal record, the rate of ACDs rose precipitously
from 19% to 47% of all non-felony cases, and the rate of plea reductions
to violations rose from 71% to 86% of non-felony conviction cases. 81
Second, with respect to sentence type and length, fewer defendants
received any jail sentence in the second period. Jail sentences dropped
from a rate of 58% to 50% of non-felony conviction cases.' Again,
recidivist defendants experienced only a slight decline (from 66% to
62%), while defendants with no criminal record enjoyed the greatest
drop (from 41% to 29%).83 More significantly, there was a decline in

sentence length from a mean of 39.1 to 19.9 days, and from a median of
20 to 7 days.84 Put simply, most jail sentences were more than halved
(for the minority of defendants who even received jail sentences). And
the sentences fell for all types of non-felony public-order offenses."
Notably, the only two non-felony offense categories that saw jailsentence increases were sex and harm-to-persons cases-respectively, a
mean rise from 6.5 to 9.5 days and from 54.1 to 76.4 days.86 And these
are the two categories of charges that fall almost wholly outside the
78. CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.19.
79. CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.17A.
80. CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbls.19 & 20. CJA, NON-FELONY
TRENDS, supra note 20, at 17A, 18 (combining all recidivist categories and A- and B-level
misdemeanors and calculating rate).
81. CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.21; CJA, NON-FELONY
TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.18 (combining A- and B-level misdemeanors and calculating
rate).
82. CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS, supra note 20, at 37.
83. Id. at tbl.23 (combining all recidivist categories and calculating rate).
84. Id. at tbl.25. Unfortunately, the data do not delineate differences in jail-sentence
length between recidivist and clean-record defendants. Id.
85. Id.

86. Id.
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public-order umbrella.
Third, defendants had to wait less time to end their cases. New York
City has a well-established history of terminating the majority of its nonfelony cases at arraignments (a defendant's first court appearance that
usually occurs less than twenty-four hours post-arrest).' The 1990s
witnessed a rise even in this historically high arraignment-disposition
rate-from 62% to 73%.' As several commentators have noted, the
process is often the principal punishment in many petty cases;
accordingly, quick dispositions may be tantamount to lenient
dispositions for the reason of speed alone. 9

87. See Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1157, 1170 (2004).
88. CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.43.
89. MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS Is THE PUNISHMENT 277 (1979); HEUMANN,
supra note 8, at 69-70 ("Contrary to what the newcomer expects, defendants are often eager
to plead guilty.... [T]hey contrast the relative ease with which they can plead guilty with the
costs in time and effort required to fight a case."); Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the
CriminalDefendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea BargainingSystem, 50 U. CHI. L.
REV. 931, 952-55 (1983) ("For it is primarily the process costs of misdemeanor justice that
currently cause all but a small minority of defendants to yield to conviction; these process
costs are, in practice, more influential than plea bargaining."); Bowers, supra note 2, at Part
II.
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Table 3
Snapshot of New York City Leniency Trend '

1989

1998

11.4%

30.0%

4.1%

6.3%

19.1%

47.2%

Overall Rate of Plea Reductions
to Violations (all non-felony
conviction cases)
Rate of Plea Reductions to
Violations, Recidivist
Defendants
Rate of Plea Reductions to
Violations, Clean-Record
Defendants
Rate of Jail Sentences (all nonfelony conviction cases)

44.0%

52.5%

28%

32%

71%

86%

55..2%

49.9%

Rate of Jail Sentences, Recidivist
Defendants
Rate of Jail Sentences, CleanRecord Defendants

70.7%

66.5%

41.1%

28.7%

Jail Sentence Length (Mean)

39.1 days

19.9 days

Jail Sentence Length (Median)
Rate of Disposition at
Arraignments

20.0 days
61.9%

7.0 days
72.7%

Overall ACD Rate (all
prosecuted non-felony cases)
ACD Rate, Recidivist
Defendants
ACD Rate, Clean-Record
Defendants

Overall, then, New York City witnessed a fairly clear leniency trend.
But the trend did not extend citywide. Instead, leniency was most
apparent in those boroughs that were directly affected by public-order
policing.'
By contrast, Staten Island, which has the highest
concentration of white residents and white defendants, experienced the
only overall jail sentence increases: the mean jail sentence rose from
20.4 to seventy-one days and the median rose from ten to forty-five
90. See CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS, supra note 20, at 35, 36, & tbls.19, 21, 23 & 25.
91. See infra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
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days.' Additionally, Staten Island had the smallest percentage rise in
ACDs.93 And it was the only borough to experience a decrease-albeit94
slight-in the frequency of cases disposed of at arraignments.
Ultimately, Staten Island's small defendant population and distinctive
sentencing practices 95 caution against reading too much into these data.
But Staten Island does appear to have been something of an outlier

from the general leniency trend.
C. ConventionalExplanations

There are three chief conventional explanations that might underlie
this leniency trend in the second period: (1) resources were tighter,
which compelled over-burdened prosecutors to offer lower prices to
ensure quicker pleas; 96 (2) the cases were less serious; 97 and/or (3) the
cases were weaker. 98 I cannot wholly refute any of these explanations.
Each, no doubt, played some part. Admittedly, there is a colorable

argument that these three explanations-taken

together-account

principally for the leniency trend. But there are reasons-beyond my
mere intuition-to believe that these explanations fail to tell the whole
story-that another force was also at play.

1. Resource Pressure
Overstretched resources are the weightiest conventional explanation
92. CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.47.
93. Id. at tbl.43.

94. Id.
95. In 1998, Staten Island sentenced defendants to jail less frequently than it had in 1989
and less frequently than other boroughs in the latter period. Id. at tbls.45 & 48. Accordingly,
it could just be that Staten Island provided lengthier jail sentences for the few defendants it
sentenced to jail. In other words, it reserved incarceratory sentences for only those
defendants who qualified for no other type of sanction and who merited particularly harsh
punishment.
96. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) ("If every criminal charge were
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply
by many times the number of judges and court facilities."); UVILLER, supra note 15, at 180-81
(discussing influence of caseload on plea bargaining). But see Worden, supra note 67, at 339
("[C]ase pressure appears to have almost no effect on plea bargaining policies."). See
generally Peter F. Nardulli, The Caseload Controversy and the Study of CriminalCourts, 70 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 89 (1979).

97. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 2000
(1992); Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 35 CONN. L.
REV. 1321, 1336 (2003).

98. HEUMANN, supra note 8, at 106 (discussing influence of case weakness on plea
bargaining); Bibas, supra note 1, at 2472-73 (noting potential for "irresistible offers in weak
cases"); Alschuler, supra note 10, at 59; Bowers, supra note 2, at Part IV.C.
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for the leniency trend. There are two broad categories of criminal
justice resources: jailhouse resources and courthouse resources. As to
the first, jailhouse resources were under no greater stress in the 1990s.
Indeed, New York City's total jail inmate population fell by almost ten
percent from 1990 to 1999-notwithstanding substantial increases in
arrests and prosecutions.99
As to the second, courthouse resources admittedly were taxed far
more heavily in the latter period; accordingly, this pressure cannot be so
readily dismissed. 1" Nevertheless, for two reasons, higher caseloads
may not have proven terrifically determinative. First, prosecutors
charged defendants more frequently and dismissed cases less frequently
in the second period. ' ' As noted, prosecutors did so because (from an
evidentiary standpoint) they typically needed only the word of police
witnesses. 10 2 But, from a resource standpoint, it is significant that
prosecutors remained able to charge at higher rates-notwithstanding
their markedly heavier dockets. This increased charge rate would seem
unexpected in a system under debilitating resource strain.
Second, the data reveal marked variability in leniency growth across
Specifically, defendants without
categories of crime and record.
criminal records and those facing public-order charges did far and away
the best. Conversely, recidivists enjoyed only marginal reductions in
sentence length and conviction charges.0 3 And jail sentences actually
rose dramatically for all categories of defendants in sex and harm-topersons cases.1"
Of course, an argument could be made that
prosecutors operating under significant resource constraints would elect
to direct the greatest discounts precisely where they went: to those
defendants for whom prosecutors felt the most sympathy-those
defendants without criminal records facing non-violent charges. But this
does not explain why sentences increased in sex and harm-to-persons
cases. (A system under heavy strain would have kept these sentences
99. See Fagan et al., supra note 23, at 75.
100. See supra note 73 and accompanying text; see also Mark Hamblett, Johnson Stays
Focused on Job as Prosecutor,N.Y. L.J. Feb. 1, 1999, at 1 (quoting Bronx District Attorney:
We still don't have anywhere near the
"The system just hasn't expanded as it should ....
judges we need to handle the volume.").
101. Supra notes 73-75, tbl.2 and accompanying text.
102. Supra note 75 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. Moreover, harm-to-persons cases saw a
decline in ACDs and a rise in convictions (whereas every other crime category, except
weapons cases, witnessed a rise in ACDs and a decline in convictions). CJA MISDEMEANOR
TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.15.
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level, at least.) In any event, there is a countervailing argument that
prosecutors under resource pressure should rationally offer lenient (and
therefore quickly consummated) pleas in the other direction: to
recidivist defendants in more serious cases because these cases present
the greatest systemic burdens. Defendants in these cases are more likely
to be detained pretrial. '0 5 Courts must provide caged buses and staffed
cells to produce them for court appearances. Therefore, courts least
want to accommodate repeat appearances for this most-costly defendant
population.' °6
2. Case Seriousness
If case seriousness were a significant factor, again, the study should
have made this plain when it controlled for crime category and record.
Presumably, defendants with like records who were charged with like
crimes should have done equally well in both periods. Yet, the data
show that the second-period defendants-with the same criminal
records and facing the same types of charges-were convicted and
received jail sentences less often, and received plea reductions more
often.0 7 And, as noted, the differences were greatest for defendants
with no criminal record. 108
Admittedly, crime categories are just rough proxies for the actual
seriousness of discrete cases, but such coarse measures seem to be
sufficient in the context of public-order offenses. After all, while firstdegree robbery may encompass widely varying degrees of conduct,
turnstile hopping generally does not. It would be strange indeed to posit
that first-period defendants without criminal records somehow hopped
turnstiles or smoked marijuana far more seriously than similarly situated
defendants a decade later.109

105. See Bowers, supra note 2, at Parts I-11.
106. See id. Nor were these expensive defendant populations small. Recidivists made up
roughly half of criminal court dockets in both periods. CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS, supra

note 20, at tbl.28. Harm-to-persons cases comprised approximately a tenth of all cases in both
periods. CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.3.
107. CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbls.21-23.

108. Supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text; infra Part III.B (arguing that cleanrecord defendants are the expected principal beneficiaries of grassroots plea bargaining).
109. Of course, there are exceptions. For example, I represented a client in a
misdemeanor case of newsworthy silliness: selling flavored ices without a vendor's license on
one of the hottest days of the year. See Sabrina Tavernise, Bronx Icy Vendor Is Put on Ice
with a Wagonload of Legalese, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at Al. But such notably silly cases
are exceptions; roughly speaking, minor crimes seem to be of fairly unitary degrees of
seriousness. (Comparatively, a Columbia psychiatry professor recently segregated different
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3. Case Weakness
My argument against case weakness is more logical than analytical
or empirical. Case weakness is undoubtedly a significant factor in plea
pricing generally. 10 However, it would not seem to play any great role
in public-order offenses. As noted, these cases typically arise wholly out
of police observation of concrete non-violent conduct."' There is little
in such circumstances to signal case weakness to prosecutors at the time
prosecutors offer pleas. First, the police paperwork is skeletal. It
usually indicates only that, for example, the officer observed the
defendant hop a turnstile or tag a wall with graffiti or enter without
permission into a public-housing unit. And this police paperwork is
generally all prosecutors have to work off of when making plea offers at
arraignments. Second, even if the police paperwork were detailed, the
paperwork would not likely accurately record indicia of case weakness.
As the Mollen Commission on Police Corruption concluded, the NYPD
in the 1990s suffered an epidemic of police "falsifications," which
included the widespread "falsification of police records, as when an
officer falsifies the facts and circumstances of an arrest in police
reports.""2
Indeed, the fact that prosecutors charged a larger percentage of
defendants in the second period (when more arrests occurred solely on
the basis of police observations) indicates that prosecutors were prone
to accept police paperwork at face value." '3 So, even where cases were
weak, prosecutors could not and would not comprehend such weakness.
III. GRASSROOTS PLEA BARGAINING

If the conventional explanations do not account completely for the
leniency trend, then what does? Return for a moment to the question of
law's legitimacy.
Wilson and Kelling might well have been right that petty crime
brands of killing into twenty-two categories that he ranked on a "depravity scale" in order of
evil. Adam Liptak, Adding Method to Judging Mayhem, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2007, at Al.)
110. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
111. Supra notes 75 and 102 and accompanying text.
112. COMM'N TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE
ANTI-CORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP'T, CITY OF NEW YORK,

COMMISSION REPORT, 36 (1994), http://www.parc.info/client-files/special reports/4 - Mollen
Commission - NYPD.pdf [hereinafter MOLLEN REPORT]; see also Zeidman, supra note 42, at
323-33. The Mollen Commission called falsifications "'the most common form of police
corruption facing the criminal justice system."' Id. at 323.
113. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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However, localized zero-tolerance

policing engendered oppression of other sorts: lives interrupted and
social ties splintered.1 1 4 Just as order-maintenance policing rose to
prominence on a wave of "compassion fatigue" for the disorderly and
the down and out,'1 5 the potent police response risked its own
backlash. "6
Critically, police and prosecutors did not need to be social-norms

theorists to comprehend potential legitimacy problems. In New York
City in the 1990s, salient instances of police overreach-most notably
the highly publicized police shootings of unarmed civilians of African
descent-made audible to everyone the pitched uproar of certain
communities against zero-tolerance policing."7
More importantly,

institutional players found themselves in unique positions to intuit even
less-apparent communal disaffection. Police observed, understood, and

were affected by this growing estrangement most directly."8
prosecutors could discern it too.

But

Generally speaking, prosecutors

devote substantial energy to securing community cooperationcooperation with investigations, evidence collection, testimony, or just
the willingness of citizens to sit on grand and trial juries and indict or

convict indictable or convictable defendants." 9 When cooperation is not
114. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
115. Ellickson, supra note 27, at 1167-68, 1218-19.
116. See Fagan & Davies, supra note 49, at 462; Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1875, 1891 ("Far
from strengthening embattled norms, criminalization is at least as likely to speed their
unraveling."); see also supra Part I.B.
117. See Fagan & Davies, supra note 49, at 462; see, e.g., Waldman, supra note 69 ("[I]t
would be difficult for Mr. Johnson, the only black district attorney in the state, to miss the
emotions swirling around the Diallo case. Protestors . . . rally outside the Bronx County
Courthouse almost daily.").
118. See CIA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at 38-39 ("The strained nature of
police-community relations has been recognized by the NYPD leadership, which has been
developing since 1996 new initiatives to improve these relationships."); see also Akerlof &
Yellen, supra note 24, at 174-75; Jason Sunshine & Tom. R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural
Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 513
(2003). Indeed, in an effort to avoid further alienation of affected communities, then-NYPD
commissioner Bill Bratton took pains to distance himself from the term "zero tolerance"-a
term most tough-on-crime advocates readily embrace. Newburn & Jones, supra note 44, at
233, 235. Remarkably, Bratton insisted that zero tolerance adequately described only the
NYPD's approach to police corruption. Id.
119. For example, Paul Butler, a former federal prosecutor, noted the widespread
understanding among urban prosecutors that they would lose many amply provable cases
"because some black jurors would refuse to convict black men who they knew were guilty."
Butler, supra note 35, at 678. Indeed, the expression "Bronx Jury" has become something of
a term of art to capture the high rates of jury nullification in these communities that harbor
such profound and problematic systemic distrust. See Waldman, supra note 69 (explaining
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forthcoming, prosecutors see it. They experience rising levels of
disengagement firsthand, and they quite obviously wish to minimize it,
because growing public disengagement makes criminal enforcement of
the law increasingly difficult.120
A. Hedging Against Anger
Dan Kahan has accurately described order-maintenance policing as
"a drug whose primary effect is that it will reduce crime, and its side
effect is that it may exacerbate political tensions." 2 ' Political tension
undermines political will. However, in this context, the requisite
political will is not of the garden-variety electoral breed. District
attorneys are elected, of course, but their fates do not usually rise and
fall with their handling of misdemeanor cases. 122 In any event, the target
communities of public-order enforcement are not those that typically
wield terrific electoral clout.' 23 The requisite political will is more of a

functional means to an end: it is the baseline level of public trust
that Bronx jurors "do not trust the police" and consequently convict five to fifteen percent
less frequently than jurors in other parts of the city); see also Butler, supra note 35, at 678-79;
Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 877, 900-01 (1999). See
generally Stuntz, supra note 36, at 1827 & n.77 (noting phenomenon of juror holdouts to
avoid convicting African-American men, and noting anecdotally that most of these holdouts
seem to be African-American women); Kennedy, supra note 34, at 1260 n.21 (noting juror
letter indicating that jury "didn't want to send anymore Young Black Men to Jail").
120. See Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants' Evaluations of
Their Courtroom Experience, 18 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 51, 52 (1984) ("Because of their interest
in maintaining public support, legal authorities have been centrally concerned with
minimizing the hostility that ... unsatisfactory government decisions might engender."); see
also Akerlof & Yellen, supra note 24, at 196 ("[T]he traditional tools for crime control-more
police cars cruising the neighborhood and longer jail sentences-wrongly applied, will be
counterproductive because they undermine community norms for cooperation with the
police."); Lawrence D. Bobo & Victor Thompson, Unfair by Design: The War on Drugs,
Race, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System, 73 Soc. RES. 445, 447 (2006)
("[D]isillusionment is contributing to a crises of legitimacy, a crisis that will ... undermine a
readiness for positive engagement with the police and with the court system."); Fagan, supra
note 59, at 70 ("If you take away that legitimacy, you take away the incentives for people to
interact with the law."); Fagan et al., supra note 23, at 73; Luna, supra note 30, at 187 (noting
"citizen reluctance to participate in the criminal process as the legitimacy of law and its
enforcers are undermined to the point of irrelevance"); Meares, supra note 35, at 590 ("The
mutual distrust between African Americans and law enforcement officers makes it less likely
that African Americans will report crimes to the police, assist the police in criminal
investigations, and participate in community policing programs that lead to greater social
control of neighborhoods.").
121. Rosen, supra note 42, at 27.
122. See Bowers, supra note 2, at Parts I.C., IV.A.
123. See generally Butler, supra note 35, at 710 ("[B]lacks are unable to achieve
substantial progress through regular electoral politics.").
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essential for effective enforcement.'24 This, then, is what grassroots plea
bargaining is all about. It is a prosecutorial tool to maximize political
will for order-maintenance policing (or, rather, to minimize the
communal will to resist it).
In the 1990s, New York City prosecutors came to the fairly obvious
conclusion that zero-tolerance enforcement posed a legitimacy threat.
As Bronx District Attorney Robert T. Johnson explained: "Feelings of
fear and frustration abound. Troubling questions have been raised,
particularly in communities of color . . . regarding police/community
relations, civil liberties and the issue of respect. . . . These questions
must be addressed."'125 But addressing these daunting questions directly
and thoroughly would have required substantial and fundamental
reform, well beyond the will or capacity of individual prosecution
offices. Prosecutors, however, had a readily available alternative
identical to one exercised frequently in the business sector to mollify
dissatisfied customers-slash prices.
As anyone who has ever
complained of shoddy service at a restaurant knows, the standard
managerial response is complimentary drinks or some other reduction
of the bill. Free booze, of course, does not address the underlying
grievance. It might not even wholly assuage the customer's anger, but,
then again, it might (as management is well aware). At bottom, slashing
prices is a comparatively easy and rational quick-fix because in the
restaurant industry-as in most industries-the loss of customer
satisfaction is of far greater consequence than the loss of a bit of
merchandise.
Similarly, prosecutors do not highly value the commodity of
sentence length in petty cases. 2 6 In the context of order-maintenance
policing, police and prosecutors have almost fully extracted the soughtafter crime-fighting value via the already-consummated arrest. 127
Thereafter, it makes eminent sense for prosecutors to give up sentence
length to foster an environment of cheap and quick pleas that allow for

124. See Rosen, supra note 42, at 27 ("[E]ffective law enforcement officials must seek
the political support of the communities they serve."). As Tom Tyler, a leading social-norms
thinker, observed, "[G]overnment authorities can only function effectively when citizens
support them enough to comply willingly with their directives." Tyler, supra note 120, at 51.
125. Excerpts from Remarks by the DistrictAttorney, N.Y. TIMES, April 1, 1999; see also

Hamblett, supra note 100 (quoting Bronx District Attorney on importance that community
have "a sense that they are being heard").
126. Bowers, supra note 2, at Part III (discussing prosecutorial unwillingness to
maximize plea prices, particularly in low-stakes cases).
127. See supra Part I.B.
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a maximal number of police arrests with minimal opening for public
backlash. In any event, line prosecutors have no other systemic means
to buy satisfaction. As indicated, they cannot readily decline to
prosecute or dismiss cases."8
Thus, plea bargaining is the only
mechanism generally available to prosecutors to reshape
criminal
29
enforcement-and perhaps public perceptions of it as well.1
This last point raises a first-order question that I have not fully
answered: Do defendant-favorable outcomes, in fact, positively impact
public perceptions of legitimacy? The brief answer is that the question
is beside the point.
Let me explain a bit further. Psychologist Tom Tyler has argued
forcefully against the conception that perceptions of legitimacy are
influenced by outcomes. Instead, Tyler has linked communal and
individual satisfaction wholly to procedural fairness.'30 On that reading,
grassroots plea bargaining would seem to do nothing at all to promote
positive perceptions of legitimacy. After all, one can forcefully argue
that cursory plea bargaining is perhaps the least fair or deliberative
process, even if the resulting outcomes are defendant-favorable.' 3 One
counterargument, however, is that quick procedures may, in fact,
correlate well with fair procedures in these petty cases because these are
the cases where defendants most want to just "get it over with."' 132 In
other words, when33the "process is the punishment," the quickest process
is also the fairest.
For present purposes, however, the better counterpoint is that the

128. See supra Part II.A.
129. The only other readily apparent option is community outreach to soften some of
the hard feelings at the margins. See, e.g., Bronx County District Attorney's Office,
http://www.bronxda.net/frames.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (providing details about
Office's community outreach programs; Community Affairs Unit; and weekly television
program, "Ask the Bronx D.A."); New York County District Attorney's Office,
http://www.manhattanda.org/community/index.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2007) (providing

details about community outreach programs and Community Affairs Unit); cf. Waldman,
supra note 69, (describing Bronx District Attorney as engaging with community members and

attending "countless community events").
130. TYLER, supra note 22, at 31-37, 64-68, 161-63; see also Tyler, supra note 120, at 53
(discussing the debate); Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 118. But see JONATHAN D. CASPER,
CRIMINAL COURTS: THE DEFENDANT'S PERSPECTIVE 48-51 (1978) (correlating defendants'

perceptions of fairness principally with outcomes and finding greater levels of satisfaction
with pleas than trials).
131. Indeed, New York City defendants reported frustration with what they saw as "an
unending cycle of revolving-door justice." CJA, RESEARCH BRIEF, supra note 20, at 7.
132. HEUMANN, supra note 8, at 69-70.
133. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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debate does not matter. To demonstrate that grassroots plea bargaining
is a genuine influence, it is of no moment whether plea bargaining
equates with fair process or even whether Tyler is right that fair
procedures are the most accurate measure of defendant satisfaction.
Instead, the entirely descriptive question of whether grassroots plea
bargaining is a real force turns solely on prosecutors' beliefs. If they
believe that case outcome (not process) is the best predictor of
defendant satisfaction, then that is proof enough of the existence of
grassroots plea bargaining, because that belief alone will motivate
prosecutors to provide discounts. And even Tyler would concede that
prosecutors operate on such a belief: "[SItudies of courts have related
case outcomes to satisfaction ... , [and] actors in the legal arena have
tended to adopt this view as well.''3
Of course, even if prosecutors are right to think that defendantfavorable outcomes positively impact satisfaction, grassroots plea
bargaining would still seem to be an incomplete panacea for individual
and communal resentment that is aimed principally at a separate (albeit
related) entity-the police. After all, ex post cheap pleas cannot wholly
wipe away the negative externalities of questionable police tactics and
arrests.'35 In target communities, police end up arresting more people on
And even though prosecutors are unaware which
less evidence. 3'
defendants face weak, silly, or even baseless charges,'37 the defendants
themselves do know, and their families and friends may know too.
Those who commit "borderline" conduct (or no unlawful conduct at all)
are bound to harbor some level of animosity even if they had to spend
only a night in jail. But, at bottom, a night is less than a week, and a
week is less than a month. The point is not that grassroots plea
bargaining definitively purchases satisfaction or wholly (or even
partially) scrubs away discontent-just that prosecutors rationally
believe it might, and they act upon that rational belief. They employ
grassroots plea bargaining because it is the most obvious and ready
prosecutorial hedge against public anger.
This premise-that prosecutors game plea offers (at least implicitly)
to maintain an adequate baseline level of systemic support-provides an
interesting corollary to a similar dynamic identified by George Akerlof

134. Tyler, supra note 120, at 53, 56 (describing this as traditional view).
135. See generally, Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 118.

136. See supra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 112-113 and accompanying text.
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and Janet Yellen.'
Akerlof and Yellen focused on a gang's optimal
level
of
criminality.
They
hypothesized
that
a

"cooperation/noncooperation"

boundary exists in all communities,

below which law-abiding members withhold necessary assistance from
authorities. 39 Accordingly, in communities with high levels of systemic
disaffection, gangs maximize wealth by victimizing community members
just up to this "cooperation/noncooperation" boundary)40 "Any higher
level of crime would trigger the community's cooperation, resulting in
expected penalties so great that crime would have a negative return.
Any lower level of crime is suboptimal...... Likewise, prosecutors use
grassroots plea bargaining to win the same leverage along the same
axis-albeit in the opposite direction."' Prosecutors lower prices to
manipulate public goodwill-to make sure
that sentiment stays just
3
above the critical cooperation boundary.
Returning, then, to my client, Eddie Wise: operationally, it was of
little importance to police and prosecutors whether loitering for the
purposes of begging was a valid offense. (Indeed, if not for a few

138. Akerlof & Yellen, supra note 24, at 175-88.
139. Id. at 186-87.
140. Id. at 184-86 ("The gang has an incentive to commit crime right up to the point
where people will cooperate with the police; but beyond that point, the community will
cooperate and crime will not pay.").
141. Id. at 186.
142. Cf.id. at 177 ("The most important constraint on the criminal activities of gangs
comes from the police power of the larger society outside its territory and the attitudes of
local residents toward cooperation with the police.").
143. Indeed, Akerlof and Yellen seemed to implicitly recognize my premise. They
identified two systemic factors impacting community cooperation: "fairness of penalties" and
"attitudes toward the police." Id. at 184. The implication is that prosecutors may be able to
make up for police overreach by offering penalties that are seen as fairer. Id. at 189-90
("[T]he optimal crime-fighting strategy does not call for punishments at infinitely high
levels.... In many situations, the optimal punishment ...is whatever penalty the community
considers fair.").
A parallel also might be drawn between my theory of grassroots plea bargaining and a
separate theory recently proposed by Keith N. Hylton & Vikramaditya Khanna in their
article, A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 61 (2007).
Hylton and Khanna argued that defendant-friendly procedural protections serve to constrain
abusive prosecutorial rent-seeking. Id. Grassroots plea bargaining provides a similar
exogenous constraint-perhaps one that is all the more necessary in petty cases where guilty
pleas are the almost-exclusive mode of disposition and procedural protections are
consequently exercised infrequently and to no great effect. Cf. Louis Michael Seidman,
CriminalProcedure as the Servant of Politics, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 207, 210 (1995) (arguing
that procedural protections are wholly ineffective, and, instead, that "constitutional
protections intended to make prosecution more difficult instead serve [to] make the
prosecutor's job easier").
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intrepid lawyers, enforcement of the adjudicated-unconstitutional
statute might have continued unabated for years more.) All that
mattered was keeping communal approbation of police conduct and
irritation with beggars sufficiently strong. As long as that balance was
achieved, police and prosecutors could effectively enforce the ostensible
law. Indeed, when the unlawful loitering arrests and prosecutions came
to light, the NYPD used just this line of reasoning to defend its unlawful
arrests: "'The arrests were made for conduct that certainly rose to the
kind of aggressive, obnoxious behavior that the NYPD is curbing.""" In
other words, the NYPD felt that what mattered was not adverse judicial
rulings of constitutional scope, but that the public wanted the behavior
punished.
B. PredictingGrassrootsPlea Bargaining
Prosecutors need not give grassroots plea bargaining discounts to all
defendants in all jurisdictions. Rather, it seems safe to assume that the
need is greatest when prosecutors in urban jurisdictions charge young,
clean-record minority defendants with petty nonviolent offenses
because localized heavy enforcement of "borderline" offenses against
such sympathetic defendants poses the greatest threat to perceptions of
legitimacy."'
Street disorder may "annoy" members of urban
4
6
communities,
but criminalizing their quasi-wayward children for
debatably unlawful conduct produces more significant angst still. 47 By
contrast, stiffer sentences would seem less likely to provoke public
backlash (i) when conduct is patently wrong (for example, in the case of
assaults or forcible sexual contact),1 48 (ii) when defendants are
recidivists, or (iii) when the police arrest defendants in affluent white
communities that are not the principal targets of police crackdowns and
14
that may, in fact, favor rigid and punitive police response. 1
Indeed, the New York City data track these assumptions. First, the

144. Jego Armstrong et al., Beggar Sues Cops & Law Is on His Side, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
June. 10, 2005, at 8 (quoting NYPD deputy commissioner).
145. See supra notes 26-30, 38, 61 and accompanying notes.
146. Ellickson, supra note 27, at 1170.
147. See Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1897 ("[A] system that aims to criminalize not only that
which almost all of us condemn but also that which only most (or some) of us condemn, is a
system bound to produce not justice, but its opposite.").
148. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
149. From my own experience as a public defender in Bronx County, prosecutors would
sometimes grouse to me in sum and substance, "You know you would never get this deal in
Westchester"-an affluent, predominately white suburb immediately to the Bronx's north.
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leniency trend was localized to the same communities that were the
principal targets of order-maintenance enforcement. Specifically, the
data show that Staten Island exhibited no clear leniency.'5 Staten Island
is predominantly white, and it has the highest concentration of white
defendants of any borough (a plurality in the second period)."' Notably,
Staten Island did not embrace leniency even though it saw the largest
percentage growth of defendants without criminal records and of
defendants aged sixteen through twenty years old-the very defendants
who would otherwise seem most likely to benefit from grassroots plea
bargaining.'5 2 By contrast, the Bronx-a predominantly minority
one of the
borough that was a policing focal point' 5 3-experienced
and the lowest overall median
largest decreases in average jail5 sentences
4
sentences in the second period.
Second, the leniency trend was most pronounced for clean-record
nonviolent defendants, a growing percentage of whom were
adolescents.'55 By contrast, the data show (i) far more marginal leniency
growth for recidivist defendants and (ii) markedly heightened punitive
response for all defendants in harm-to-person or sex cases. 56 In short,
prosecutors directed grassroots plea bargaining to its most obvious
targets, providing the greatest discounts to the very clean-record
nonviolent defendants who were most likely to rouse communal
sympathy and spark potential backlash.'57
150. Supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
151. CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.42.
152. Id. at tbls.40 & 41.
153. Hamblett, supra note 100 (noting a two-thirds rise in number of arrests in Bronx
from 1993 to 1998).
154. CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbls. 40-41 & 47 (noting that
Bronx sentences fell from a mean of 24.5 to 18.8 days and from a median of 15 to 5 days).
Separately, a statewide New York study has shown that defendants in urban and
predominantly minority jurisdictions received lower sentences than defendants in more
affluent and rural jurisdictions. NELSON, supra note 77, at 70-73 & tbl.24; see also infra Part
1II.C.
155. See CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.17A; CJA, MISDEMEANOR

TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.21; CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.18
(combining A- and B-level misdemeanors and calculating rate).
156. See supra notes 81, 83, tbl.3 and accompanying text.
157. Of course, it could also be that these defendants received better bargains because
they were the subject of direct prosecutorial empathy. But there are reasons to believe this
was not the case. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text; infra notes 163-64 and
accompanying text. In any event, as I have indicated from the start, my aim is not to prove
that grassroots plea bargaining was the definitive reason for leniency in New York City in the
1990s (I do not believe that it was), only that grassroots plea bargaining is a plausible and
heretofore unrecognized plea bargaining influence. And the numbers are wholly consistent
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C. A Normative Implication
If grassroots plea bargaining is a real force pushing down plea prices
in minority communities, then this raises a final highly charged question:
Is grassroots plea bargaining a kind of redistributive correction to
recognized racial "tilts" in criminal justice enforcement?15' The answer
is yes and no. From a broad view, defendants in urban and minorityheavy jurisdictions are bound to do better on balance. 9 Assessed more
narrowly, however, within discrete jurisdictions of every type-urban,
suburban, rural, poor, or rich-individual white defendants seem to do
better than minority defendants.' 60 Specifically, a statewide New York
study found that when all counties were analyzed collectively
whites were sentenced to longer jail terms than
minorities for almost all categories of arrest charge, prior
criminal record score, concurrent felony arrests, and age
at arrest ... [because] [m]ost minorities were processed
in counties that sentenced defendants to relatively short
terms, whereas most whites were processed in counties
1 61
that sentenced defendants to relatively long terms.
Conversely, when the study compared white defendants to minority
defendants in individual counties a "different pattern" emerged:
minorities were convicted and sent to jail more frequently, they received
longer jail sentences than whites, and they were offered fewer ACDs. 62
Such racial disparities in favor of white defendants cut against
conventional perceptions that lenient treatment in urban communities
might just be the result of prosecutors' own individualized conceptions
of appropriate punishment for poor minority defendants-some kind of
"white paternalism"1 63 or what Heather Gerken might call "dissenting by
with that proposition.
158. Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1893 ("[W]e keep experiencing anti-vice crusades that
target racial or ethnic minorities who live in urban poverty. Police and prosecutorial
discretion have produced these tilts ....");cf. Stuntz, supra note 36, at 1838-39 (raising
possibility of enhanced punishment for affluent white defendants, but conceding that such a
proposal would be politically impossible).
159. NELSON, supra note 77, at 70-73 & tbl.24.
160. Id. See generally Mufioz & Sapp, supra note 19, at 38, 42-43.
161. NELSON, supra note 77, at 70-73 & tbl.24.
162. Id. at 31-40, 62-63, 70-73, 95 & tbls.11, 12, 13, 20 & 24.
163. Mufioz & Sapp, supra note 19, at 42-43 ("'White paternalism' ... can work to the
detriment of Whites, particularly in counties with large non-White populations .... Judges

may be more attuned to the costs of overtly discriminating against non-Whites... [or] judges
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deciding." '6' Rather, it seems that when prosecutors offer lenient prices
of their own volition, they typically exercise that kind of discretion to
Conversely, when prosecutors
the benefit of white defendants."'
establish low "going rates" in urban jurisdictions, it is not because they
want to, but because they have to in order to avoid debilitating noncooperation.
may expect and have higher tolerance for non-White crime, and ... hold Whites to higher
moral standards.").
164. Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748 (2005)
("Dissenting by deciding occurs when would-be dissenters-individuals who hold a minority
view within the polity as a whole-enjoy a local majority on a decisionmaking body and can
thus dictate the outcome."). Examples of this kind of prosecutorial decision making are San
Francisco District Attorney Terrence Hallinan's announcement that he would no longer
pursue three-strike convictions for many types of felonies or Bronx District Attorney Robert
Johnson's refusal to seek the death penalty in any case. See Jonathan DeMay, A District
Attorney's Decision Whether to Seek the Death Penalty: Toward an Improved Process, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 767, 768-70 & 768 n.6 (1999); Tony Perry & Maura Dolan, Two
Counties at Opposite Poles of '3 Strikes' Debate, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1996, at Al. Dissenting
by deciding, then, depends on the prosecutor's own views of proportionally appropriate
punishment. For example, District Attorney Robert Johnson declared that he had no
"present intention" to pursue the death penalty because of his personal "'intense respect for
the value and sanctity of human life."' DeMay, supra, at 768 & n.6 and accompanying text.
And Terrence Hallinan remarked: "'I myself feel I am able to tell the difference between a
bad person and someone who has just done the wrong thing."' Perry & Dolan, supra.
165. In the charging context, the now infamous "Jena 6" case provides a telling analogy.
In that case, Reed Walters, the District Attorney of Jena, Louisiana, took a narrow view of
the criminal code in declining to prosecute white students who had strung nooses to a tree,
but took an expansive view in charging black students with attempted murder after a
subsequent attack on a white classmate. Howard Witt, Jena 6 Defendant Out of Jail, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 28, 2007, at C4. A firestorm of grassroots protest erupted over Reed's charging
decisions. Notably, after an appeals court reversed the felony conviction of one of the black
students, Reed elected not to recharge the student as an adult. Id. As one lawyer indicated,
the grassroots response had forced Reed's hand; he could only proceed as he saw fit at the
risk of undermining necessary community cooperation: "I think [Reed] is under tremendous
pressure. There's not a single district attorney in the state that doesn't want to see this whole
thing go away. They are concerned about jury nullification in their own cases-they don't
want the system to be seen as so unfair." Id.
166. The notion of plea prices as fixed "going rates" helps answer a further potential
objection. Specifically, one might posit that even if there is a pro-white bias, that bias is of
less force than grassroots plea bargaining. Accordingly, because white defendants pose no
obvious legitimacy threat (and do not, therefore, need to be given grassroots-plea-bargaining
discounts), they should still do worse in predominantly minority jurisdictions than minority
defendants (who are the subjects of grassroots plea bargaining). But white defendants in
minority jurisdictions may end up receiving the race-based discount and the grassroots-pleabargaining discount. The reason for this potential double discount is that plea prices for
particular offenses in particular jurisdictions start at fixed points-"going rates"-that are
intuitively known to defense attorneys and that prosecutors may not abandon without push
back from defense attorneys (and possibly judges). See Bowers, supra note 2, at Part III.C.
So, in a predominantly minority jurisdiction, the fixed opening price for all defendants-white
or minority-is the grassroots-plea-bargaining price. From there, a white defendant may
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The cynical view, then, is that grassroots plea bargaining may be no
more than a tool that enables unpopular and otherwise unsustainable
enforcement policies. In other words, beware of prosecutors bearing
gifts; they are mere agents of a normatively problematic and otherwise
unsustainable discriminatory status quo.167 The optimistic view is that
grassroots plea bargaining provides (in a pragmatic and politically
feasible way) a much-needed "bottom up" fix to a historically
draconian, unjust, and racially disparate "top down" punishment
regime." Such a fix might not be all bad-whatever the prosecutorial
motivation.
CONCLUSION

Prosecutors want to enable vigorous police enforcement, but they
concurrently wish to deflate communal perceptions of illegitimacy and
objections about unfair treatment. So, prosecutors set low prices for
public-order offenses in an effort to have their cake and eat it too. This
is grassroots plea bargaining, and it becomes a genuine influence any
time the system attempts to strictly enforce "borderline" offenses
against members of communities that feature traditionally discordant
police-citizen relations.
As police and prosecutors shift to zero
tolerance in their arrest and charging decisions, prosecutors
concurrently move toward greater tolerance in their plea-bargaining
decisions. In this way, grassroots plea bargaining is just another instance
of the oft-noted pattern that when the system attempts to eliminate the
exercise of discretion it merely pushes that exercise to other points in

benefit yet further from implicit pro-white bias.
167. Under this reading, lenient plea deals pose the same problem that critical legal
theorists ascribe to the rhetoric of rights. See Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over
Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26 (1984) ("[T]hey start talking as if 'we' were rights-bearing
citizens who are 'allowed' to do this or that by something called 'the state,' which is a
passivizing illusion-actually a hallucination which establishes the presumptive political
legitimacy of the status quo."); cf. Seidman, supra note 143, at 207, 210-11 (arguing that
procedural protections "entrench the status quo" by "mak[ing] the punishment we inflict on
criminal defendants seem more acceptable" and by therefore "contribut[ing] to an
atmosphere that promotes acceptance of a situation that ought to shock us"); Louis Michael
Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673 (1992).
168. Butler, supra note 61, at 1000. Grassroots plea bargaining thereby helps to ensure
the "tolerably moderate" punishments that Meares and Kahan advocated upon defending
gang-loitering ordinances. Meares & Kahan, supra note 32, at 213; see also supra note 36.
Along this line, some critics of order-maintenance policing have proposed reducing petty
misdemeanors to statutory violations. See, e.g., Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 65, at 3. To
some extent, by offering such frequent plea reductions and ACDs, prosecutors have de facto
adopted this proposal.

20071

GRASSROOTS PLEA BARGAINING

the process."'
Ultimately, more work must be done to determine (i) the scope of
grassroots plea bargaining, (ii) whether it is normatively positive, and
(iii) whether it even succeeds in fostering communal perceptions of
legitimacy in the face of unpopular enforcement policies. It could be
that these questions prove unanswerable. Some theorists have argued,
after all, that diverse influences on real-world bargaining are
"unquantifiable"-either collectively or in isolation. 17 If this is so, all
we can hope to do is put fingers down on as many of these manifold
influences as possible. Grassroots plea bargaining is such an influence.
It is one more force pulling crime and punishment outside the shadow of
law.

169. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 147 (1996) ("Sentencing policy can

only be as mandatory as police, prosecutors, and judges choose to make it.").
170. See, e.g., Barnhizer, supra note 21, at 171 (arguing that the only quasi-effective
measurement of bargaining power is a loose "multifactor balancing test").
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